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Abstract
Argument schemes are abstractions substantiating the inferential connection between 
premise(s) and conclusion in argumentative communication. Identifying such con-
ventional patterns of reasoning is essential to the interpretation and evaluation of 
argumentation. Whether studying argumentation from a theory-driven or data-driven 
perspective, insight into the actual use of argumentation in communicative practice is 
essential. Large and reliably annotated corpora of argumentative discourse to quan-
titatively provide such insight are few and far between. This is all the more true for 
argument scheme corpora, which tend to suffer from a combination of limited size, 
poor validation, and the use of ad hoc restricted typologies. In the current paper, we 
describe the annotation of schemes on the basis of two distinct classifications: Wal-
ton’s taxonomy of argument schemes, and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments. 
We describe the annotation procedure for each, and the quantitative characteristics 
of the resulting annotated text corpora. In doing so, we extend the annotation of the 
preexisting US2016 corpus of televised election debates, resulting in, to the best of 
our knowledge, the two largest consistently annotated corpora of schemes in argu-
mentative dialogue publicly available. Based on evaluation in terms of inter-anno-
tator agreement, we propose further improvements to the guidelines for annotating 
schemes: the argument scheme key, and the Argument Type Identification Procedure.
This research was supported in part by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) in the United Kingdom under Grant EP/N014871/1, and in part by Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Grant 435-2012-0104.
This paper was drafted over 2018–2019 during which time, our friend and co-author, Douglas 
Walton, contributed to the project with his customary zeal and generosity. Shortly after submission 
of the second and final review version of the manuscript just before Christmas 2019, we heard the 
tragic news of Doug’s death. His absence is felt keenly by us all, both personally and academically. 
In the scholarly domain, his work over a quarter of a century on the topic of argumentation schemes 
has inspired us to think more deeply and to innovate more creatively, and we hope that this paper can 
serve as a part of our recognition and gratitude to Doug for his academic vision, his commitment to 
collaboration, and to his gentle generosity of spirit.
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1 Introduction
Theory-driven and data-driven studies of argumentation alike rely on data about 
the actual use of argumentation in communicative practice—to test top-down 
theorising, or found a bottom-up empirical approach. This data can come from 
the qualitative appraisal of selected examples, or from quantitative approaches. 
While labour intensive, the latter are gaining traction—motivated in part by the 
requirements of machine learning methods for automated text processing. Quan-
titative approaches require (preferably large) corpora of actual argumentative dis-
course annotated with the necessary theoretical notions and concepts.
In the current paper, we address the annotation of text corpora with argument 
schemes. To elucidate the general approach, specific procedures, and value of the 
outcomes, we make use of two distinct typologies representing different theo-
retical perspectives and rationales. Douglas Walton’s taxonomy of argumentation 
schemes (Sect.  3.1) is an empirically oriented classification of schemes based 
on the examination of the apparent conventions of argumentative practice. Jean 
Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments (Sect.  3.2) is at the other end of the 
spectrum, starting from multiple a priori criteria devised to exhaustively describe 
all possible instantiations in actual practice. In the current paper, we do not wish 
to evaluate the appropriateness or correctness of any theory—whether Walton’s 
or Wagemans’ or any alternative. Like many alternatives, both approaches have 
their place and value within scholarly traditions and for various applications: 
Walton’s taxonomy has found wide uptake in the study of argumentation (within 
both traditional and computational approaches), while Wagemans’ decomposi-
tional approach is applied in formal linguistics and yields possible advantages 
for automation and explication—and other alternatives have their own advantages 
and disadvantages.
Instead of reflecting on the theoretical or practical validation of any particular 
approach, we focus on the annotation of a corpus on the basis of the two distinct 
typologies. In doing so, we aim to explain the annotation task and its difficulties 
(Sect. 2), draw annotation guidelines from the two typologies (Sect. 3), present 
the resulting annotated corpora (Sect. 4), suggest ways of improving the annota-
tion of schemes (Sect. 5), and illustrate two applications of the resulting corpus 
data (Sect. 6).
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2  Argument Scheme Corpora
2.1  Conceptions of Argument Schemes
Understanding the inferential principles underpinning argumentation is essen-
tial to its proper interpretation and evaluation. Since antiquity, explicating these 
inferential principles has been one of the main scholarly objectives in the study 
of argumentation (Rubinelli 2009). As one such explanation, the notion of 
‘argument(ation) scheme’ was introduced during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury (Garssen 2001). Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) introduced 
the similar notion of ‘argumentative scheme’ in The New Rhetoric, the current 
understanding of argument scheme goes back to Hastings’ (1963) PhD thesis and 
the conceptualisation in van Eemeren et al. (1978)’s first handbook on Argumen-
tation Theory.1 Argument schemes capture the conventionally acceptable patterns 
of reasoning that are appealed to in argumentative communication, substantiat-
ing the inferential connection between premise(s) and conclusion. The defeasibil-
ity of the schemes sets them apart from the strict reasoning patterns of classical 
formal logic (e.g., modus ponens), as does the dialogical nature of the schemes 
evident in their association with ‘critical questions’ used to evaluate the accept-
ability of an applied argument(ation) scheme.2
Since their introduction, argument schemes have become a central issue in mod-
ern argumentation studies, leading to a variety of classifications, e.g., by Schellens 
(1985), Kienpointner (1992), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), and van Eeme-
ren and Garssen (2019). Although the concept was developed for different purposes, 
it has also found uptake in computer science and artificial intelligence (Rahwan and 
Simari 2009; van Eemeren et al. 2014; Baroni et al. 2018). Within these areas, Wal-
ton’s approach to argument schemes (Walton 1996; Walton et al. 2008) is most influ-
ential (van Eemeren et al. 2014). Walton’s classification comprises a great variety 
of schemes, described in some detail, but with the flexibility to allow adjustments 
in order to fit a scheme to a desired domain-specific application or research project 
[see, e.g., the revisions and extensions of the practical reasoning scheme by Atkin-
son and Bench-Capon (2018), and Kokciyan et al. (2018).]
One of the great challenges facing this work has been the principled organisa-
tion and taxonomisation of schemes (see, e.g., Katzav and Reed (2004); Walton 
and Macagno (2015)), leading other authors such as Wagemans (2016) to propose 
a priori exhaustive grounds for scheme definition and classification. While Wal-
ton’s classification can be characterised as an empirically motivated taxonomy of 
types of argument encountered in argumentative practice, Wagemans’ Periodic 
1 In the literature, various authors use different terms to signify the same general idea (with small varia-
tions): e.g., ‘argument scheme’ (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992), ‘argumentation scheme’ (Walton 
1996), and ‘argumentative scheme’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). In the present paper, we will 
predominantly use the term ‘argument scheme’.
2 Not all current accounts of argument(ation) schemes emphasise this communicative angle, favouring a 
reinterpretation of the interactional critical questions as static exceptions or defeaters (van Eemeren et al. 
2014).
 J. Visser et al.
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Table of Arguments is a factorial typology that specifies a comprehensive set of 
argument types on the basis of a limited set of theoretical descriptions of argument 
characteristics.
2.2  Existing Argument Scheme Annotations
The development of large-scale data resources consisting of text (corpora) in 
which certain characteristics have been annotated with codes expressing particu-
lar argumentative notions and concepts constitutes a corpus-linguistic approach 
to argumentation: the collection and annotation of a textual dataset (‘corpus’) 
to aid the quantitative empirical study of language (‘linguistics’). The notions 
and concepts used for annotation are ordinarily based on a particular theoretical 
framework. To ensure the annotation is reliable and consistent, explicit guidelines 
are specified, containing instructions for annotators.
Existing text corpora annotated with argument schemes tend to be based on 
Walton’s taxonomy, although some alternatives are explored. A constant, how-
ever, is that evaluations of the reliability of the annotation methods show that this 
is a difficult task to perform. Lindahl et al. (2019), for example, annotated a cor-
pus of Swedish newspaper editorials, achieving low agreement between the anno-
tators. Musi et  al. (2016) present a set of annotation guidelines on the basis of 
the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti and Greco 2019), achieving a Fleiss’ 
(1971) 휅 of 0.1 with minimally trained non-expert annotators, increasing to 0.307 
after further training with improved guidelines.
For quantitative studies and for computational machine learning applications 
alike, it is important that annotated corpora are sizeable and balanced, reliably 
distinguishing a broad range of scheme types. However, many existing argument 
scheme annotation projects start from a limited ad hoc selection of scheme types 
to take into consideration. For example, Duschl (2007) initially adopts a selec-
tion of nine argument schemes described by Walton (1996), for his annotation 
of transcribed middle school student interviews about science fair projects. At 
some point during the study, however, he collapses some of the classes to end up 
with four more general coding labels no longer directly related to any particu-
lar scheme types. This deviation from Walton’s theoretically motivated taxonomy 
appears to be only motivated by the need to improve annotation agreement. The 
validation of the annotation method does not account for chance agreement, by 
only providing percentage-agreement scores (instead of resorting to, e.g., Cohen’s 
(1960) 휅 ). Out of a total of 17 annotated texts, Duschl (2007) reports the inter-
annotator agreement on two as being, respectively, 90% and 84%. No detail is 
provided on the sampling method.
In a similar way, Song et  al. (2014) base their annotation on a modification of 
Walton’s taxonomy, settling on a restricted set of three more general schemes: pol-
icy, causal, and sample—resulting in Cohen’s 휅 scores for inter-annotator agreement 
ranging widely from 0.364 to 0.848. Anthony and Kim (2015) employ a bespoke 
set of nine coding labels modified from the categories used by Duschl (2007) and 
nine schemes described in a textbook by Walton (2006). They do not measure any 
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inter-annotator agreement, opting for a fully open collaborative annotation without 
any testing of reliability of the methods. Cabrio et  al. (2013) explore correlations 
between the Penn Discourse Treebank (Prasad et  al. 2008) and a selection of five 
schemes from those presented by Walton (1996)—argument from example, argu-
ment from cause to effect, argument from effect to cause, practical reasoning, and 
argument from inconsistency—while also suggesting two new ones: argument from 
equivalence and argument from specification.
2.3  Argument Scheme Annotation Task
2.3.1  Source Data
The source data in our argument scheme annotation task comprises transcripts of 
televised debates for the 2016 presidential elections in the United States of America. 
The communicative context in which the debates takes place influences the argu-
mentative activity, as it determines, e.g., the outcomes aimed for, the roles of the 
participants involved, and the rules or conventions with respect to the argumenta-
tive means available to them (van Eemeren 2010). The interests and values of the 
individual participants further shape the practice (Fairclough 2006): the context of 
televised election debates is heavily influenced by the candidates’ objective to per-
suade the electorate to vote for them, and the broadcasting networks’ aim of provid-
ing a fair and well-viewed platform for doing so.
Ever since the first televised election debate between then US presidential candi-
dates John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon in 1960, television debates have played an 
important role in the democratic process in many countries (Kraus 2013). The gen-
eral election and the associated television debates between Hillary Clinton and Don-
ald Trump as the candidates for the two dominant political parties in the US (respec-
tively the Democratic Party and the Republican Party) took place in the Autumn of 
2016. Prior to the general elections, both main parties held primary elections and 
caucuses to elect their party’s candidate for the presidency. These primaries were 
also preceded by television debates between the leading prospective candidates in 
2015 and 2016.
While the format of each of the debates is slightly different, there are some 
recurring characteristics. Being television debates, the discourse is spoken, with 
transcripts available retrospectively through a variety of sources, and video record-
ings broadcast live and available afterwards. The participants are expected to use 
language that is appropriate for the occasion: balancing the political nature of the 
issues discussed with the need to keep the proceedings comprehensible for a broad 
untrained audience. A selection of a limited number of candidates is invited to these 
events, moderated by anchors and journalists from the television networks that air 
them (among others, CBS, CNN, Fox News, and NBC). The television networks’ 
moderators pose questions to the invited candidates, and guide the debate (for exam-
ple by keeping time and order), while the candidates make opening statements, 
answer the moderators’ (and occasionally the public’s) questions, defend their views 
 J. Visser et al.
1 3
and challenge those of their political opponents, in an attempt to garner more sup-
port among the electorate.
For the primaries, the Republican party held 12 debates for the front-runners 
and seven so-called ‘undercard’ debates between the next tier of candidates. The 
Democratic party held 10 primary debates. As time went on and more of the candi-
dates withdrew their candidacy, the number of participants declined over the course 
of these series of debates. For the general elections, three television debates were 
organised between Democratic candidate Clinton and Republican candidate Trump, 
and one debate between their vice-presidential candidates.
The argumentation encountered in the debates is not always explicitly signalled 
with linguistic markers, nor necessarily cohesive. The television debates are a spoken 
genre of discourse. This means that the history of the dialogue is not entirely available 
to the participants, as they forget details of what transpired in the earlier stages of the 
debate. This may lead to occasional repetitions and contradictions of what was said 
earlier. Furthermore, candidates cannot always rely on their prepared and practised 
lines and topics, but have to respond to unexpected turns and twists, and to interaction 
with the other candidates and moderators. Because responding well to such dynamic 
situations is expected to instil the voters’ confidence in the candidate, candidates 
receive support to varying degrees from communication professionals in their prepara-
tion and training, and rely on their experience in political debate.
The context of televised election debates fosters a mixture of well-structured and 
well-presented argumentation that appears to have been prepared in advance, and 
impromptu argumentation originating from the need to cope with the interactional 
dynamics. The level of noise in the data—in terms of e.g. crosstalk, unconventional 
use of discourse markers, and low discourse cohesion—poses a challenge in the 
analysis of the argumentation. Consider Example (1), advanced by then prospective 
candidate Trump. Trump anticipates that his claim about the topic of immigration 
will not be outright accepted. He therefore supports it with multiple statements, but 
does so in a non-straightforward fashion. Upon closer inspection, Trump’s support 
relies mostly on the rhetorical device of repetition, with several of his assertions 
constituting rephrases instead of inferences.
(1)  Donald Trump: So, if it weren’t for me, you wouldn’t even be talking about ille-
gal immigration, Chris. You wouldn’t even be talking about it. This was not a 
subject that was on anybody’s mind until I brought it up at my announcement. 
And I said, Mexico is sending. Except the reporters, because they’re a very 
dishonest lot, generally speaking, in the world of politics, they didn’t cover my 
statement the way I said it.
2.3.2  The US2016 Corpus
The US2016 corpus presented by Visser et al. (2019a) contains annotated transcripts 
of the first television debates leading up to the primaries of the Democratic party, 
the primaries of the Republican party, and the 2016 General Election for the US 
presidency (Peters and Woolley 1999). Additionally, the US2016 corpus contains 
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related annotated social media posts extracted from the Reddit social media plat-
form (http://www.reddi t.com), and the argumentative interaction between the user-
generated social media posts and the candidates’ debating on television (Visser et al. 
2018a). The collected corpus was annotated by four annotators on the basis of Infer-
ence Anchoring Theory (IAT) (Reed and Budzynska 2011). Building on insights 
from discourse analysis and argumentation studies, IAT conceives of argumenta-
tive conduct in terms of the anchoring of argumentative reasoning in communica-
tive interaction. By reinterpreting the speech act theoretical notion of ‘illocutionary 
force’ (Austin 1962; Searle 1969), the eponymous anchoring is theoretically con-
ceptualised as the intentional ‘illocutionary connection’ between argumentative con-
tent and locutions in dialogue. IAT annotations capture the propositional structure 
of argumentation as well as its dialogical structure, in a machine-readable format to 
facilitate computational processing (Chesñevar et al. 2006).
The full version of the IAT annotation guidelines is available online at http://arg.
tech/US201 6-guide lines . Here we reproduce a summary selection of the essential 
notions.
– Segments divide the (transcribed) text into locutions, consisting of a speaker des-
ignation and an ‘argumentative discourse unit’ (a text span with discrete argu-
mentative function) (Peldszus and Stede 2013).
– Transitions capture the functional relationships between locutions, reflecting the 
dialogue protocol—a high level specification of the set of transition types that are 
available in a particular communicative activity.
– Illocutionary connections embody the intentional communicative functions of 
locutions or transitions, such as: Agreeing, Arguing, Asserting, Challenging, Dis-
agreeing, Questioning. Some types of illocutionary connection lead to the recon-
struction of a propositional content.
– Inferences are directed relations between propositions, reflecting that a proposi-
tion is meant to supply a reason for accepting another proposition. An argument 
scheme can be specified; failing that, it is labelled as Default Inference.
The full annotation guidelines have been validated by calculating the inter-annotator 
agreement on a 11.3% sample, resulting in a Cohen (1960)’s 휅 of 0.610, and a CASS 
(Duthie et al. 2016) 휅 of 0.752—both indicating substantial agreement according to 
Landis and Koch (1977)’s standard interpretation of the kappa metric. The result-
ing annotated US2016 corpus is freely available online at http://corpo ra.aifdb .org/
US201 6. Table 1 compiles representative quantitative characteristics of the US2016 
corpus: word count, and counts of, e.g., text segments (‘locutions’), arguments 
(‘inference’), counterarguments (‘conflict’), and the most relevant types of illocu-
tionary connections (Visser et al. 2019a).
In addition to the characteristics of the US2016 corpus, Table 1 shows the proper-
ties of the US2016G1tv sub-corpus comprising the annotated transcript of the first 
head-to-head debate for the general elections between Clinton and Trump (Peters 
and Woolley 2016). We include this sub-corpus in particular, because it constitutes 
the source material for our argument scheme annotation.
 J. Visser et al.
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2.3.3  Annotation Procedure
The IAT annotation of the US2016G1tv corpus resulted in 505 inferential argumen-
tative relations. Each of these relations can be classified as instantiating a particu-
lar reasoning principle—its argument scheme. For example, during the first general 
election debate, Clinton advanced the argument in Example (2).
(2)  Hillary Clinton: And we finally need to pass a prohibition on anyone who’s on 
the terrorist watch list from being able to buy a gun in our country. If you’re 
too dangerous to fly, you are too dangerous to buy a gun.
Example  (2) is annotated with IAT in the US2016G1tv corpus as two proposi-
tions connected by a directed inference relation from premise to conclusion. As vis-
ualised in Fig. 1, the inference relation between the two propositions is initially left 
unclassified—the ‘Default Inference’ node connects the premise at the bottom to the 
conclusion at the top. The task of annotating argument schemes consists of classify-
ing these inferential relations on the basis of a particular typology—in our case, with 
Walton’s taxonomy of argumentation schemes, and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of 
Arguments.
Two annotators trained in argumentation analysis and with prior knowledge of 
argument schemes used the annotation guidelines laid out in Sects. 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 
to classify 55% of the inferential relations in the US2016G1tv corpus. These new 
annotations form an extension of the preexisting US2016G1tv corpus, resulting in 
two new corpora that contain the original IAT annotation and the classifications of 
the argument schemes (see Sect. 4). The random allocation of 55% of the 505 infer-
ences in the corpus to the two annotators results in a 10% overlap. This random sam-
ple is used for calculating the reliability of the guidelines (see Sect. 5).
Fig. 1  Diagrammatic visualisa-
tion of Example (2) in the IAT-
annotated US2016G1tv corpus
 J. Visser et al.
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3  Annotation Guidelines for Argument Schemes
3.1  Annotation with Douglas Walton’s Taxonomy
3.1.1  Taxonomy of Argumentation Schemes
The known set of argumentation schemes should not be regarded as complete or 
immutable, but rather as a work in progress that is continually subject to readjust-
ment and refinement as concepts defining the schemes are formulated in more 
precise ways and applied to new examples. Improving the classification system of 
schemes is a continuous process of adjustment between collecting data, sharpen-
ing criteria that enable the identification of a scheme, and used to refine the tax-
onomy to assist the ongoing collection of data.
The classification system byWalton et al. (2008, pp. 349–350) divides schemes 
into three general categories: reasoning, source-based arguments, and applying 
rules to cases. Under reasoning five subcategories are distinguished: deductive 
reasoning, inductive reasoning, practical reasoning, and abductive reasoning. 
Under the general heading of source-based arguments, four schemes are listed: 
argument from position to know, argument from commitment, argument attacking 
personal credibility, and argument from popular acceptance. The third general 
category is called ‘applying rules to cases’. It has four subcategories: arguments 
based on cases, defeasible rule-based arguments, verbal classification arguments, 
and chained arguments connecting rules in cases. Each of these second-level 
types of schemes contains categories at a finer level of granularity. These third-
level schemes include many of the schemes that are so highly familiar to research-
ers on argumentation. For example, the third category under source-based argu-
ments contains the following three schemes: argument from allegation of bias, 
poisoning the well by alleging group bias, and ad hominem arguments.
Walton et  al. (2008,  p. 348) acknowledge that because of the difficulty of 
defining the concepts that any classification system of schemes has to be based 
on—such concepts as knowledge, causation, threat, and so forth—any attempt 
to classify schemes faces conceptual difficulties in adequately defining the con-
tested concepts used at the top levels of the tree structure. For this reason, the 
2008 system of classifying schemes is to be regarded as a provisional hypoth-
esis that should be subject to improvement as further empirical and analytical 
work on schemes classification continues. In the ten year interval, the explosion 
of research on argument mining (Lawrence and Reed 2019; Stede and Schnei-
der 2018) has raised many fine-grained questions about how particular groups of 
schemes should be fitted together into the larger picture of any general classifica-
tion system.
Subsequent work by Walton and Macagno (2015) presents a survey of the lit-
erature on scheme classification, as well as outlining how the 2008 system can be 
modified in order to accommodate current research in artificial intelligence and 
computational linguistics on argument mining. It was shown how the procedure of 
developing and using classification systems can only move forward by combining 
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two approaches. One of these is a top-down approach that begins with concepts 
formulated at a high level of abstraction that any classification system of schemes 
has to be based on, including such concepts as knowledge, causation, threat, and 
so forth. This top-down approach then moves to particular types of schemes that fit 
under these general categories. Finally, it moves to schemes representing the types 
of arguments we are already so widely familiar with. But at the same time, as pro-
gress on argument mining and other quantitative empirical research continues, it is 
also necessary to have a bottom-up approach that begins with real examples of argu-
ments at the ground level of cases that distinguish in a very particular way between 
subtypes of a given scheme (Walton 2012). What happens at this bottom-up level is 
that commonalities between patterns of reasoning are used to start to build clusters 
of schemes, and then these clusters have to be fitted into more general classifica-
tions of schemes, resulting in a classification system in which the higher levels have 
been developed a priori and the lower levels by empirical generalisations.
A central practical problem inherent in the current experimental work on argu-
mentation schemes with corpus-linguistic and computational-linguistic approaches 
is that the annotators lack enough specific guidance on how to decide whether an 
argument found in a real natural language text can properly be said to fit a particular 
scheme or not. An early study on the annotation of kinds of arguments put forward 
by candidates in a provincial election in Canada classified 256 arguments using 14 
schemes and a category called “none of the above” (Hansen and Walton 2013). A 
group of six coders, two of them experts in argumentation theory, found it difficult to 
classify arguments in some instances because of the open texture of key terms used 
in the schemes. As a solution to this problem, Walton (2012) recommends devising 
a set of identification conditions that can be used to offer coders additional guidance 
on whether a particular scheme fits a particular case or not. In Sect. 3.1, we build 
on these identification conditions to extend and refine our annotation guidelines, by 
functionally clustering the set of 60 upper level schemes catalogued by Walton et al. 
(Walton et al. 2008, pp. 308-346) for the practical task of text annotation.
3.1.2  Annotation Guidelines for Walton’s Taxonomy
Walton’s taxonomy of argumentation schemes is operationalised as annotation 
guidelines on the basis of the Argumentation Schemes book from 2008 (Walton 
et al. 2008). More specifically, the guidelines consist of Chapter 9 of the book: A 
User’s Compendium of Schemes (Walton et  al. 2008,  pp. 308–346), which com-
prises an extensive description of 60 main scheme types. The annotation classes are 
constrained to these 60 main schemes, disregarding the many listed variants. Exam-
ples not fitting any of the 60 schemes are labelled ‘default inference’ to indicate 
that they elude classification with Chapter  9 of the Argumentation Schemes book 
(following Hansen and Walton’s (2013) use of the ‘none of the above’ category). 
Since the annotation of argument schemes is an extension of the existing IAT anno-
tation of the basic US2016G1tv corpus, in some cases, the scheme labels need to be 
applied in a simplified, condensed or partial manner, to fit the pre-existing structure.
To facilitate their decision making, the annotation guidelines are supplemented 
by a classification decision tree—a fragment of which is shown in Fig. 2. Primarily 
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intended as an indicative annotation heuristic, the decision tree systematises the 
scheme set according to argument properties indicative of particular schemes. Each 
of the top-level branches of the tree represents divisions into general categories 
(for example, arguments based on character, or based on opinion), before breaking 
these down further by following a path of simple binary questions until a particular 
scheme classification is reached. In using the decision tree heuristic, the annotators 
follow the arrows of the flow chart, making yes/no choices at each diamond-shaped 
binary question, to eventually end up at an argument scheme, represented in the 
rounded squares, or the fallback default inference label if the argument does not fit 
any of the schemes in Walton’s (2008) taxonomy. The idea of an annotation decision 
tree will be further explored in Sect. 5.1.
3.2  Annotation with Jean Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments
3.2.1  Periodic Table of Arguments
A recently developed classification of argument types (Gobbo and Wagemans 
2019a, b, c; Visser et al. 2018b; Wagemans 2016, 2017, 2018a, b, 2019a), the Peri-
odic Table of Arguments (PTA) aims to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive 
alternative for the variety of existing taxonomies of argumentative techniques. The 
PTA presents a transparent theoretical rationale for distinguishing between the types 
of argument. It uses formal(isable) language for characterising these types, and it 
integrates the dialectical and rhetorical conceptualisations of argument into a single 
systematic and comprehensive whole.
The PTA conceives of an argument type as a characterisation of an inference rela-
tion, i.e., the specific way in which a premise supports a conclusion. The argument 
Fig. 2  Fragment of the decision tree heuristic for distinguishing between action-oriented argument 
schemes in Walton’s taxonomy
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types distinguished within its theoretical framework are ‘atomic’ in the sense that 
they consist of one premise and one conclusion, both of which are expressed by 
means of a statement that consists of a subject and a predicate. Following logical 
conventions, subjects are indicated with lowercase letters a, b, etc., predicates with 
uppercase X, Y, etc. (predicate ⊤ having the fixed meaning ‘true’), and complete 
propositions with letters p, q, etc.
The theoretical framework of the PTA consists of three independent partial char-
acterisations of argument, namely as (1) a first-order or second-order argument; (2) 
a predicate or a subject argument; (3) a specific combination of types of statements.3 
The superposition of these three partial characterisations yields a factorial typology 
of argument that can be used in order to develop tools for analysing, evaluating, and 
producing arguments in natural language.
The distinction between first-order and second-order arguments hinges on the 
complexity of the statements that function as the premise and the conclusion of the 
argument. First-order arguments contain simple statements that cannot be broken 
down any further—such as ‘The suspect was driving fast, because he left a long 
trace of rubber on the road’. Second-order arguments are different in that they con-
tain at least one complex statement, the subject of which can be broken down into a 
subject and a predicate itself. An example is ‘We only use 10% of our brain, because 
that was said by Einstein’, which has the conclusion about brain use functioning as 
the subject of the premise.
The distinction between predicate and subject arguments draws on the differences 
and similarities between the constituents of the conclusion and the premise of the 
argument. In short, the statements of predicate arguments contain the same subject 
and different predicates, while those of subject arguments contain different subjects 
and the same predicate.
Finally, using a widely accepted tripartite typology of statements developed in 
debate theory, the conclusion and premise of arguments are characterised as state-
ments of fact (F), statements of value (V), and statements of policy (P). By iden-
tifying the type of statement of the conclusion and the premise, arguments can be 
characterised as a specific combination of types of statements—for example, a PF 
argument combines a statement of policy in its conclusion and a factual statement in 
its premise.
When taken together, these three partial characterisations of argument constitute 
a theoretical framework that allows for 2 × 2 × 9 = 36 different types of argument. 
Their systematic names consist of indicators for the three partial characterisations 
mentioned above. The prefixes 1 and 2 indicate first-order and second-order argu-
ments. The infixes pre and sub indicate predicate arguments and subject arguments. 
Finally, combinations of P, V and F as suffix distinguish the various combinations of 
statements of policy, value and fact, respectively.
3 Depending on the needs or the requirements of the application, the categorisation can be further differ-
entiated by adding another partial characteristic as a constituent to the theoretical framework. For present 
purposes, we focus on the three standard constituents of first-/second order, subject/predicate, and propo-
sitions of value/policy/fact.
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The systematic names of the 36 types can subsequently be related to correspond-
ing ‘trivial’ names known from the literature on argument schemes and related tax-
onomies, with each systematic type hosting an arbitrary number of trivially named 
‘isotopes’. An argument that has been classified as a first-order predicate argument 
combining a statement of fact with another statement of fact, for instance, would be 
labelled with the systematic name 1 pre FF. Depending on the linguistic expression 
of the relationship between the two factual statements, the trivial name of this argu-
ment could be argument from sign, from cause, from effect, or similar.
3.2.2  Annotation Guidelines for Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments
Because the typology of the PTA is based on the interplay between three distinctive 
characteristics of the arguments, the annotation task has been decomposed into three 
partial classification sub-tasks. In one of the sub-tasks, each proposition is classified 
as being of one of the three types distinguished in the PTA. The remaining two sub-
tasks pertain to the inference relations between the propositions.
A proposition is classified as a proposition of fact if its veracity can be verified 
through empirical observation. It is classified as a proposition of value if it contains 
some evaluation (such as, ethical (e.g. right/wrong), aesthetical (e.g. beautiful/ugly), 
legal (e.g. guilty/innocent), or logical (e.g. true/false) evaluations). It is classified as 
a proposition of policy if it expresses a plan of action or an act to be carried out.
An inference relation is classified as first-order if it connects two propositions 
each containing a subject-predicate pair. It is classified as second-order if its prem-
ise is a locution (often the result of reported speech), or if the premise is otherwise 
applying a predicate to the full proposition of the conclusion.
Finally, inference relations are classified as a predicate or a subject argument. 
The relation is classified as a predicate argument if the propositions involved share 
the same subject term to which different predicates are applied, and as a subject 
argument if vice versa.
Fig. 3  Diagrammatic visu-
alisation of the annotation of 
Example (2) as an instance of 
practical reasoning from anal-
ogy in the US2016G1tvWAL-
TON corpus
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4  Annotation Results
4.1  Results of Annotation with Walton’s Taxonomy
The results of the annotation in accordance with Walton’s classification of argumen-
tation schemes are collected in the US2016G1tvWALTON corpus (freely available 
online at http://corpo ra.aifdb .org/US201 6G1tv WALTO N). In the corpus, the argu-
ment schemes are represented as part of an AIF-compliant graph structure (see 
Sect. 2.3.2), an example of which can be seen in Fig. 3. This figure shows the origi-
nal IAT-segmented propositions of Example (2), and the inference relation between 
them classified as an instance of practical reasoning from analogy.
Of the 505 inference relations in the original US2016G1tv corpus, a total of 491 
are annotated with one of the 60 argument scheme types in Walton’s classification, 
leaving only 14 as unclassified default inference. As the scheme counts in Table 2 
show, the most common scheme, by some margin, is argument from example.
4.2  Results of Annotation with the Periodic Table of Arguments
Table 3 collects the results of the three partial annotations on the basis of the PTA: 
first-/second-order and predicate/subject arguments, and propositions of fact, value 
and policy. The great majority of annotated arguments are first-order: 481 out of the 
total of 505. There are also more than twice as many predicate arguments as there are 
subject ones. Furthermore, propositions of value and fact greatly outnumber proposi-
tions of policy. Table 3 also lists the number of ‘unclassified’ results in each sub-task.
From these partial results, an aggregated final classification is derived, assigning to 
each of the argumentative inferences one of the 36 possible main types of the PTA (e.g. 
1 pre FF). If the partial classification of any of the inference relations or propositions 
involved in an argument failed (‘unclassified’ in Table 3), this leads to a classifica-
tion as Default Inference in the final aggregation step. Similarly, any inference relation 
involving several premises without a dominant proposition type is assigned Default 
Inference. The final classification is included in the US2016G1tvWAGEMANS cor-
pus (freely available online at http://corpo ra.aifdb .org/US201 6G1tv WAGEM ANS).
The counts of the aggregated argument types are compiled in Table  4. As 
expected from the partial results, the proportion of second-order arguments is nota-
bly low: accounting for only 8 out of a total of 505 inference relations. Conversely, 
there is a high number of default inference classifications, especially when com-
pared to the corresponding count for Walton’s taxonomy in Table 2. This label is 
assigned to any inference relation which could not be classified on at least one of the 
partial sub-classifications—an issue we return to in Sect. 5.2.
4.3  Comparison of Results
The parallel annotation of the same original corpus with the two typologies of 
Sects.  3.1 and 3.2 opens up possibilities for comparative studies. In a qualitative 
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sense, the dual annotation allows us to search for specific individual examples and 
analyse how these are respectively dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Quantitatively, 
Table 2  Counts of 
argument schemes in the 
US1816G1tvWALTON corpus
Argument scheme Count
Argument from example 81
Argument from cause to effect 48
Practical reasoning 45
Argument from consequences 40
Argument from sign 38
Argument from verbal classification 32
Generic ad hominem 28
Circumstantial ad hominem 24
Pragmatic argument from alternatives 23
Argument from values 15
Default inference 14
Argument from position to know 13
Argument from fear appeal 11
Argument from alternatives 9
Argument from bias 9
Argument from analogy 8
Argument from popular opinion 8
Argument from danger appeal 7
Argument from popular practice 7
Argument from composition 6
Ethotic argument 5
Practical reasoning from analogy 4
Argument from commitment 3
Argument from expert opinion 3
Argument from waste 3
Argument from gradualism 2
Argument from need for help 2
Argument from oppositions 2
Argument from perception 2
Argument from correlation to cause 1
Argument from definition to verbal classification 1
Argument from division 1
Argument from ignorance 1
Argument from rules 1
Argument from vagueness of verbal classification 1
Argument from witness testimony 1
Argumentation from interaction of act and person 1
Pragmatic inconsistency 1
Two-person practical reasoning 1
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the two resulting annotated corpora allow us to survey overall characteristics and 
draw more general conclusions.
In Sect. 4.1, we returned to Example  (2) which was classified as practical rea-
soning from analogy in Walton’s classification. If we are interested in this particu-
lar type of argument, we can locate the same example in the US2016G1tvWAGE-
MANS corpus. On the basis of the PTA guidelines, it is classified as 1 pre PV: a first 
order predicate argument with a value proposition as premise and policy proposal as 
conclusion. Such particular examples in the parallel corpora could be used to inform 
the comparison between the various types of argument scheme in each theoretical 
approach.
We can also compare the two annotations by cross-referencing the results numeri-
cally, as shown in Table 5. This co-occurrence matrix gives an overview of the cor-
respondence between the overall results with the two typologies. To keep the table 
concise, we have excluded scheme classifications with fewer than three occurrences. 
This type of data is instrumental in, amongst others, the further development of 
the PTA by providing a basis for the specification of the ‘isotopes’ of the types of 
argument distinguished in the table (see Sect. 3.2.1). The co-occurrences show, for 
example, that arguments classified as 1 pre PF according to the PTA—first order 
predicate arguments justifying a policy proposal on the basis of a factual proposi-
tion—tend to be associated with arguments from consequences, example, and three 
Table 4  Counts of 
argument types in the 
US2016G1tvWAGEMANS 
corpus
Argument type Count
Default inference 85
1 pre VV 78
1 pre VF 61
1 sub VV 50
1 pre FF 47
1 pre FV 27
1 pre PP 27
1 pre PV 25
1 sub VF 23
1 sub FV 17
1 pre PF 15
1 sub FF 10
1 pre VP 8
1 sub PF 7
1 pre FP 5
1 sub PP 5
1 sub VP 4
1 sub PV 3
2 pre FV 3
2 preVF 2
2 pre VV 2
2 pre FF 1
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variations of practical reasoning and pragmatic argument schemes in Walton’s 
taxonomy.
Of the 505 arguments in the original US2016G1tv corpus, most can be classi-
fied under both annotations: on the basis of Walton’s taxonomy, 97% is classified as 
something other than default inference, which drops to 83% for annotation with the 
PTA. There are 12 instances that defy classification under either approach. Several 
factors conspire to result in these elusive cases. Firstly, the argumentation structures 
in US2016G1tv were not initially annotated with scheme classification in mind. The 
resulting structures can thus be difficult to match to the specification constraints in 
both Walton’s taxonomy and Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments. Addition-
ally, some of the propositions annotated as inferentially connected by the original 
IAT annotators of the US2016G1tv corpus turn out not to be amenable at all to clas-
sification of the underlying argument scheme. This can be the result of annotation 
mistakes in US2016G1tv, where something may mistakenly have been annotated as 
an argumentative inference relation while none is present—perhaps by misinterpret-
ing a causal discourse marker as reliable indicator of argumentative inference, such 
as ‘so’ in Example  (3). In other cases, an utterance may justifiably be interpreted 
as expressing an intention to draw an inference—duly annotated as such in the pre-
existing IAT annotation of US2016G1tv—while it is not clear at all what type of 
scheme is used, such as in Example (4).
(3)  Donald Trump: We’re just opening up on Pennsylvania Avenue right next to 
the White House, so if I don’t get there one way, I’m going to get to Pennsylva-
nia Avenue another.
(4)  Donald Trump: Sean was in favour of the war. And I understand that side, 
also, not very much, because we should have never been there.
A notable difference between the annotations with Walton’s taxonomy and 
with Wagemans’ PTA is that the latter produces intermediate classification results 
in addition to overall results. This is the case even if the final classification fails. 
In particular, the annotation of proposition types is relevant and beneficial to the 
verification of premise acceptability (Freeman 2000), and the persuasiveness of an 
argument (Reynolds and Reynolds 2002; Hoeken and Hustinx 2003). Both can only 
be reliably appraised when knowing against what standard this should be done—
whether it be correctness of stated facts, agreement with expressed values, or ade-
quacy of proposed policies. Table 3 shows the results of the classification of the 798 
propositions in the corpus: the majority of 376 is classified as value, followed by 
298 propositions of fact, and 108 propositions of policy—with a Cohen’s 휅 (Cohen 
1960) of 0.778 (see Sect. 5.2). A disadvantage of breaking down the annotation task 
into constitutive sub-classifications is that each stage risks introducing obstacles for 
the final classification. If in any of three associated sub-tasks it is not entirely clear 
how to classify one part of an argument, then the overall final classification will end 
up as default inference. In Sect. 5.2 we address the resulting relatively high number 
of default inferences in the PTA annotation, and suggest a solution.
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5  Evaluation and Revision of Annotation Methods
5.1  Discussion of Guidelines for Walton’s Taxonomy
The annotation of argument schemes on the basis of Walton’s taxonomy is evaluated 
by calculating the agreement between the two annotators. For this purpose, a 10.2% 
random sample of all inference relations in the US2016G1tv corpus was annotated 
by both annotators. This yields a Cohen’s 휅 (Cohen 1960) of 0.723—well within 
substantial agreement according to the Landis and Koch (1977) interpretation.
Some classes of argument scheme turned out to be particularly difficult to dis-
tinguish. For example, Example  (5) was classified by one annotator as practical 
reasoning, related to promoting goals, and by the other as argument from values, 
related to promoting values. This difficulty is also reflected in the fact that Walton 
et al. (Walton et al. 2008, p. 324) describe a subtype of practical reasoning called 
value-based practical reasoning—itself not included in our annotation guidelines, 
because of the restriction to top-level argument schemes.
(5)  Hillary Clinton: What I have proposed would be paid for by raising taxes on 
the wealthy [...] I think it’s time that the wealthy and corporations paid their 
fair share to support this country.
The annotated corpus contains 14 Default Inference classifications. There are two 
explanations for these arguments defying classification on the basis of the guidelines 
of Sect.  3.1.2. As we discussed in Sect.  3.1.1, Walton’s taxonomy of argumenta-
tion schemes should not be considered as fixed, but rather as an developing system. 
So while the current annotation guidelines cover all 60 main scheme types, this list 
should not be taken as comprehensive—neither in terms of exhaustively describing 
all possible types of argument, nor of detailing all ways of distinguishing between 
similar types. Additionally, the original IAT annotation of argument structure in the 
US2016G1tv corpus was not done with argument schemes in mind. Some constella-
tions of premises and conclusions would hence be structurally annotated in a differ-
ent way if the objective of matching them to Walton’s argumentation schemes was 
taken into account from the start.
In comparison to other annotation methods for argument schemes (Sect.  2.2, our 
method of supporting the annotation with a heuristic decision tree (Sect. 3.1.2) leads to 
reliable inter-annotator agreement and a wide variety of identified scheme types. For this 
reason, we further developed this heuristic method, from its first incarnation to a robust 
annotation tool that could support trained experts, and non-experts alike. To this avail, 
we recognise that the annotation procedure relies heavily on the distinctive properties 
of arguments that are characteristic for a particular scheme. In that sense, the procedure 
bears a striking resemblance to biological taxonomy, the identification of organisms in 
the various sub-fields of biology (see, e.g., Voss 1952; Pankhurst 1978).
Drawing on this biological analogue, we envision a taxonomic key for argument 
scheme annotation. A taxonomic key can be seen as a textual rendering of a decision 
tree—serving the same function. For identifying biological organisms, keys have 
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long proven suitable for both experts and the masses, without the need for specialist 
training—which becomes relevant when considering the prospects of crowd-sourc-
ing the annotation task (Musi et al. 2016).
In “Appendix A” we specify a taxonomic key for the identification of argument 
schemes in accordance with Walton’s taxonomy: the Argument Scheme Key (ASK), 
version 1.4 The ASK is a dichotomous identification key that leads the analyst 
through a series of disjunctive choices based on the distinctive features of a ‘spe-
cies’ of argument scheme to the particular type. The choices are informed by group-
ing together scheme types in Walton’s taxonomy that share particular characteris-
tics. For example, the ASK starts by distinguishing between source-based and other 
arguments. Each subsequent choice in the key leads to either a particular argument 
scheme, or to another numbered entry with a further distinction. The entries with 
distinctive characteristics are numbered—following the standard in Biology—with 
between brackets the number of the previous characteristic that led to this particular 
point in the key.
For example, an analyst goes through the following sequence of numbered char-
acteristics in identifying an argument as an instance of argument from popular 
opinion:
• 1 source-based;
• 2 about the source’s opinion;
• 9(2) based on existing opinion;
• 11(9) source is a group of people.
5.2  Discussion of Guidelines for Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments
The PTA annotation is validated by calculating the inter-annotator agreement for the 
three partial classifications, as well as for the final aggregated schemes. For the clas-
sification of propositions as statements of fact, value, or policy, a random sample of 
13.4% was annotated by both annotators, resulting in a Cohen’s (1960) 휅 of 0.778. 
The classification of predicate arguments and subject arguments yields a Cohen’s 휅 
of 0.851 on a 10.0% sample. Also on a 10.0% sample, the classification of first-order 
arguments and second-order arguments results in a Cohen’s 휅 of 0.658. The inter-
annotator agreement for the overall aggregated scheme classification on the basis of 
the PTA results in a Cohen’s 휅 of 0.689 on a 10.4% sample.
The agreement scores on the partial and final PTA annotations all fall within the 
range of substantial to almost perfect agreement (Landis and Koch 1977), suggesting 
that the division into independent sub-tasks simplifies the annotation while maintain-
ing reliability. Consequently, we envision that this type of annotation with the PTA 
could lend itself well to a crowd-sourced or otherwise untrained/non-expert annota-
tion approach—amongst others, Miller et al. (2019) show that decomposing complex 
4 In the ASK, we include the argument from consequences twice, in its positive (marked +) and its nega-
tive (marked –) variant. We decided to include both because the characteristics that allow annotators to 
distinguish these schemes lead to two very different routes through the identification key.
 J. Visser et al.
1 3
argument annotation tasks into simpler constitutive sub-tasks makes them suitable for 
crowd annotation.
A comparison between the agreement scores for the three PTA annotation sub-tasks 
shows that the classification of arguments as first-order or second-order leads to the 
least reliable results—while the 휅 of 0.658 still amounts to substantial agreement (Lan-
dis and Koch 1977). We hypothesise that the lower score is a result of the unbalanced 
nature of the dataset, with a strong predominance of first-order arguments. As the com-
piled partial results in Table 3 show, the second-order arguments account for only 11 
out of the total of 505 inference relations, compared to 481 first-order arguments. This 
imbalance has a strong impact on the Cohen’s 휅 metric, which becomes all the clearer 
upon calculating the corresponding percentage-agreement: the two annotators agreed in 
their first-/second-order classification in 98.0% of the cases.
The most common aggregate type in the US2016G1tvWAGEMANS corpus is 
Default Inference at 17%—see Table 4. This high proportion results from the aggre-
gation of the partial results into the final argument types. Because the three partial 
results are combined into the final types, the constitutive propositions and inferential 
relation all have to be classified individually in the sub-tasks. Therefore, a failure to 
classify any of the individual components will cause the overall argument type to 
default into the Default Inference category. If a proposition cannot be classified in 
terms of policy/value/fact (for example, because it is too vague), or if the relation is 
not clearly first- or second-order, or if the propositions are incomplete to the extent 
that it is not clear whether the subject or predicate is responsible for the transferring 
of justificatory force, then the aggregated final classification of the argument as a 
whole fails, resulting in a Default Inference.
The structural characteristics of the IAT annotation complicate matters for subse-
quent PTA annotation. IAT caters for arguments with multiple premises, and com-
plex structures of argumentation (such as linked arguments or coordinatively com-
pound argumentation). In contrast, the PTA only considers arguments consisting of 
one proposition as premise, and one proposition as conclusion.
Another complication stems from the source material on which the annotation 
of schemes builds. As a result of, for example, interruptions, corrections, and general 
obscurity, the speech in the transcribed election debates is incomplete or not syntactically 
well-formed. The PTA, in contrast, presupposes that premises and conclusions of argu-
ments consist of complete categorical propositions comprising a clear subject-predicate 
structure. However, the preexisting IAT annotation of the original US2016G1tv corpus 
does not reconstruct the transcribed text of the election debate to that degree of detail. 
Since the starting point of the annotation with the PTA was that the original structural 
IAT annotation would be left unchanged, an interpretative step is required to get from 
the naturally expressed argument in the data to a proposition that can be classified. This 
means that it is up to the analysts to correctly interpret the propositions while doing the 
PTA classifications—something that can be difficult, as becomes clear from an example 
such as (6), comprising two propositions connected with the discourse marker ‘because’, 
indicative of argumentation (van Eemeren et al. 2007).
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(6)  Donald Trump: And one of your compatriots said, you know, whether it was 
before or right after, Trump was definitely—because if you read his article, 
there’s no doubt.
Table 3 shows that all but 13 inference relations could be classified as first- or 
second-order, and all but 14 propositions as value, policy or fact. Classification 
as subject or predicate argument, however, failed in 73 cases. This led Visser and 
Wagemans (2018) to propose a revision of the annotation guidelines by operational-
ising the notion ‘argument form’ in accordance with the most recent iteration of the 
theoretical framework of the PTA (Wagemans 2019a, b). The argument form can be 
determined by considering up to three heuristic questions (as shown in the decision 
tree reproduced in “Appendix B”), resulting in a combination of the first two partial 
characterisations of arguments—as a first-order or second-order argument and as 
a subject or predicate argument. The combination of the two characteristics yields 
four possible argument forms, constituting the four quadrants of the PTA:
• first-order predicate arguments, instantiating the form ‘a is X, because a is Y’, 
and constituting the Alpha Quadrant,
• first-order subject arguments, instantiating the form ‘a is X, because b is X’, con-
stituting the Beta Quadrant,
• second-order subject arguments, instantiating the form ‘q is T, because r is T’, 
constituting the Gamma Quadrant,
• and second-order predicate arguments, instantiating the form ‘q is T, because q 
is Z’, constituting the Delta Quadrant.
Given that the guidelines used for the present annotation (see Sect. 3.2.2 ) only men-
tion instructions for identifying second-order predicate arguments, one would expect 
the relatively high number of default inferences to drop if the annotation is carried 
out by using the revised guidelines that include instructions for identifying second-
order subject arguments as well.
A final problem we will discuss here is related to the third characteristic mentioned 
in the theoretical framework of the PTA—the specific combination of statement types 
substantiated by the conclusion and the premise of the argument. As explained in 
Sect. 3.2.1, the PTA distinguishes between three types: statements of value, policy, 
and fact. The annotators reported that it was sometimes particularly difficult to dis-
tinguish statements of value from the other two types—especially from statements 
of fact. For example, Trump’s statement (7), on the topic of Clinton’s use of a private 
e-mail server, was classified by one annotator as a statement of fact, and by the other 
as a statement of value. The question here is whether the emphasis is on the evalu-
ative judgment about the legality of the act, or rather on the factual description of 
someone invoking the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution to refuse testimony.
(7)  Donald Trump: Clinton has the man that set up the illegal server taking the 
Fifth Amendment
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This kind of qualitative evaluation of the annotation guidelines indicates the need 
for a more elaborate description of what counts as a specific type of statement. Com-
plementing the notion ‘argument form’, Visser and Wagemans (2018) reframe the third 
partial characteristic as ‘argument substance’. Additionally, they propose to revise the 
description of statements of value as statements expressing an evaluative judgment about 
something that is based on a subjective selection and weighing of assessment criteria. 
To help the analyst distinguish statements of value from statements of fact, the following 
examples of sub-types provide guidance in determining the ‘substance’ of an argument:
• Statements of value:       A statement expressing an evaluative judgment about 
something that is based on a subjective selection and weighing of assessment 
criteria. The following examples of sub-types should help the analyst distinguish 
them from statements of fact:
– aesthetic judgments, such as ‘The Corrections is a great novel’
– moral or ethical judgments, such as ‘Circumcision is reprehensible’
– legal judgments, such as ‘Unauthorized copying is not theft’
– pragmatic judgments, such as ‘Our plan for reducing CO2-emission is feasi-
ble’
– logical judgments, such as ‘This proposition is true’
– hedonistic judgments, such as ‘Paragliding is fun’.
Together, the operationalisation of Visser and Wagemans’ (2018) notions of ‘argu-
ment form’ and ‘argument substance’ constitute revised annotation guidelines in the 
form of an Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP).5
6  Applications of Annotated Argument Scheme Corpora
6.1  Argument Mining
Argument mining (Stede and Schneider 2018; Lawrence and Reed 2019) is a 
rapidly growing field, with an increasing number of methods being developed to 
automatically process textual data and reconstruct argumentative content. How-
ever, most of these techniques are limited by the lack of consistently annotated 
argument data at sufficiently large scale. The use of crowdsourced annotation 
(Ghosh et al. 2014; Skeppstedt et al. 2018) and automatic methods to extend the 
data currently annotated (Bilu et al. 2015) have helped this situation somewhat, 
though even these struggle with more fine grained annotation such as the annota-
tion of argument scheme instances.
One of the first approaches to mining Walton’s argument schemes (Feng and Hirst 
2011), uses the Araucaria corpus (Reed 2006) as training and test data for a machine 
5 The ATIP (Wagemans 2019a) is available in full online at http://www.perio dic-table -of-argum ents.org/
argum ent-type-ident ifica tion-proce dure.
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learning classifier that aims to distinguish between instances of the top five most com-
monly occuring schemes in this corpus. Whilst the results for this task are promis-
ing (with accuracies of 0.63–0.91 achieved in one-against-others classification and 
0.80–0.94 in pairwise classification) the small number of scheme instances and lack 
of explicit, validated annotation guidelines means that this dataset cannot be used to 
explore a full range of scheme types.
More recent techniques for mining schemes have either used small sets of hand 
curated scheme examples (Lawrence and Reed 2016) or developed specific classifi-
cations to aid the creation of larger datasets in varying domains—for example: Green 
(2015) lists ten custom argument schemes targeted at genetics research articles; Wyner 
et al. (2012) describe a consumer argument scheme, with the structure of this scheme 
used to guide an argument identification process.
Walton (2011) also notes the lack of a systematic approach to computationally iden-
tifying arguments and their schemes. To address this challenge, we might first identify 
the arguments occurring in a piece of text, followed by the identification of specific 
known argument schemes. Beyond this initial identification, however, there are likely to 
be issues differentiating between similar schemes, which can be addressed by develop-
ing a corpus of borderline cases.
With the data currently available, the ontologically rich information provided by argu-
ment schemes has been demonstrated to be a powerful component of a robust approach 
to argument mining. Collaboration amongst analysts as well as the further development 
of tools supporting schemes (such as the OVA online annotation tool (Lawrence et al. 
2019)) is essential to growing the datasets required to improve on these techniques. Clear 
annotation guidelines for Walton’s taxonomy of schemes, such as the Argument Scheme 
Key (see Sect. 5.1 and “Appendix A”), will hopefully result in a rapid growth in the mate-
rial available and further increase the effectiveness of automated schematic classification.
The sub-task of classifying proposition types in accordance with Wagemans’ Peri-
odic Table of Arguments (PTA) typology (Sect. 3.2) also resonates with existing work 
in argument mining. Park and Cardie (2014) distinguish between three proposition 
types (unverifiable, verifiable non-experiential, and verifiable experiential), aiming 
to automatically identify each of these in online user comments in order to highlight 
propositions which are insufficiently supported. In subsequent work (Park and Cardie 
2018), the authors revise their typology to include the three proposition types of the 
PTA: propositions of non-experiential fact (fact); propositions of value (value); propo-
sitions of policy (policy); propositions of experiential fact (testimony); and reference to 
a resource (reference). Others have also followed similar proposition type classifica-
tions: Dusmanu et al. (2017) distinguish between factual and opinion-based arguments 
on Twitter; while Al Khatib et al. (2016) classify argumentation strategies in terms of 
common ground, assumptions, testimony, statistics, anecdotes, and other; and Rinott 
et al. (2015) distinguish between three evidence types: study, expert, anecdotal.
The classification of propositions as factual in particular has gained prominence 
as part of fact-checking endeavours in combating fake news. Hassan et al. (2015), 
for example, classify sentences as non-factual, unimportant factual, and check-wor-
thy factual. Similarly, Patwari et al. (2017) and Jaradat et al. (2018) automatically 
determine the ‘fact-check-worthiness’ of factual claims in political debates. Naderi 
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and Hirst (2018) automatically distinguish between true, false, stretch, and dodge 
statements in parliamentary proceedings.
6.2  Rhetorical Profiling
The availability of argumentatively annotated text corpora of appropriate size and 
quality opens up new possibilities for applying quantitative empirical methods in the 
study of argumentation. On the basis of the corpora we present in the current paper, 
we can explore the use of corpus-based metrics for Argument Analytics. Introduced 
by Lawrence et al. (2016), Argument Analytics provide a suite of automated tech-
niques for statistical analysis and infographics-style visualisation to produce intui-
tive insights into large-scale argumentative discourses. Extending the existing meth-
ods, we can construct an empirically-grounded rhetorical profile of a speaker, by 
matching the classification of arguments with who advanced them. This allows us to 
characterise the speakers’ style of arguing in terms of, for example, their selection of 
argument schemes, and the type of standpoints they advance.
We employ these data-driven characterisations to rhetorically profile the rela-
tive styles of Clinton and Trump in their first head-to-head television debate (see 
Sect. 2.3.1). Combining aspects of the original IAT-based annotation with the annota-
tions with the Waltonian argumentation schemes (Sect. 3.1) and the Periodic Table of 
Arguments (Sect. 3.2), the corpus-based analytics allow us to show differences in the 
rhetorical styles of the two candidates on the basis of quantitative empirical evidence.
During the debate, Trump spoke for 45min3sec, and Clinton for 41min50sec. In 
their respective speaking time, Trump advanced 292 arguments, while Clinton accu-
mulated a much lower total of 194. As expected in political debates, both Clinton 
and Trump regularly made use of Arguments from Example, Cause to Effect, Sign, 
and Consequences. Striking is Trump’s propensity for personal attacks, such as in 
Example (8). 15% of his arguments consist of Circumstantial or Generic Ad Homi-
nem and Argument from Bias, compared to 7% of Clinton’s.
(8)  Donald Trump: And she doesn’t say that, because she’s got no business ability. 
[...] But you have to have some basic ability. And sadly, she doesn’t have that. 
All of the things that she’s talking about could have been taken care of during 
the last 10 years, let’s say, while she had great power.
Trump also uses a considerably higher number of Fear Appeals to justify his 
standpoints: 10 for Trump (making up 3.4% of his total number of arguments), 
against 1 for Clinton (0.5%). Clinton, on the other hand, relies more heavily on Pop-
ular Opinion and Popular Practice argument schemes than Trump does: 10 counts 
for Clinton (constituting 5% of her arguments) against 4 counts for Trump (1%). 
Furthermore, she employs the Argument from Values 10 times (5.2% of her argu-
ments), while Trump only relies on values 5 times (1.7%).
Another stark difference in the rhetorical choices made by Clinton and Trump 
is the type of claims defended. In political debates, especially in election times, 
we might expect to find a high proportion of policy proposals—such as the one in 
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Example (2). Indeed, in 28% of the cases, Clinton argues in defence of a standpoint 
constituting a statement of policy. Trump however only support statements of policy 
in 9% of his arguments. This distinctive difference in rhetorical style is further con-
firmed by the candidates’ use of the Practical Reasoning argument scheme, in which 
a plan of action is defended on the basis of a particular goal: 17% of Clinton’s argu-
ments constitute Practical Reasoning, against 4% of Trump’s.
7  Conclusion
Adopting a corpus-linguistic approach to argument schemes, we introduce, apply, 
and revise practical guidelines for the annotation of corpora of real-world argumen-
tative data. Consequently, we present a text corpus annotated on the basis of two 
distinct typologies of schemes: Walton’s taxonomy of argumentation schemes and 
Wagemans’ Periodic Table of Arguments (PTA). The two resulting annotated cor-
pora should prove useful both for quantitative empirical approaches to the study of 
argumentation, and to computational research into argument mining—the automated 
reconstruction of argumentative content in natural language texts of arbitrary length 
(Stede and Schneider 2018; Lawrence and Reed 2019).
For each of the two classifications of schemes, we describe and validate the anno-
tation procedure, and present the resulting annotated text corpora (Sects.  3.1 and 
3.2). In doing so, we extend the annotation of the pre-existing US2016G1tv corpus, 
comprising the first television debate between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump 
for the 2016 US presidential elections (Visser et al. 2019a) (Sect. 2.3.1). To the best 
of our knowledge, the resulting two corpora are the largest of their kind: publicly 
available corpora of argumentation annotated with discourse structure, speech acts, 
argument structure, and two versions of scheme types. Based on an evaluation in 
terms of Cohen’s 휅 (Cohen 1960) yielding at least substantial inter-annotator agree-
ment across the board, we suggest revisions to the guidelines for annotating schemes: 
the Argument Scheme Key (ASK) for annotation with Walton’s taxonomy (“Appen-
dix A)”, and the incorporation of a distinction between argument form and argument 
substance in the Argument Type Identification Procedure (ATIP) for annotation with 
Wagemans’ PTA (“Appendix B”). The presented methods should provide solid foun-
dations for the development of robust and diverse datasets for the empirical study of 
argumentation, and for applications in AI and machine learning alike.
The parallel annotation of the same US2016G1tv corpus on the basis of both 
Walton’s taxonomy and Wagemans’ PTA opens up new avenues for quantitative 
research into argumentation. While comparing and reconciling different approaches 
to scheme classification is not one of our objectives in the current paper, the meth-
ods presented and data obtained are useful for such purposes. Neither of the two 
approaches we discuss should be considered complete or final, while both start from 
very different theoretical foundations. Walton’s taxonomy comprises a great many 
schemes described in varying detail. It should not be regarded as a completed struc-
ture, but as a work in progress that is continually readjusted and refined as the con-
cepts defining the schemes are formulated in a more precise way and applied to new 
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examples. Similarly, Wagemans’ PTA is under constant development. His approach, 
however, is based on an a priori constrained set of possible combinations between 
three distinct characterisations of argument, used to scaffold the systematisation of 
encountered instances of argument types. While Walton’s approach provides the 
flexibility and richness needed to apply the general methodology to the particular 
needs of a research project or practical application, Wagemans’ approach provides 
an exhaustive set of possible classifications, much needed in computational applica-
tions. Comparative data (such as the co-occurrence matrix of Table 5) can contrib-
ute directly to any attempts of crossing the foundational starting points of the differ-
ent typologies—for purposes of both reconciliation and contrasting.
While our annotation approach results in the largest and most reliable datasets of their 
kind, the fact that we also propose possible ways of improving the annotation guide-
lines shows that the work we present here is not without its limitations. The original 
US2016G1tv corpus, for example, was not specifically developed with future scheme 
annotation in mind. The result is that some of Visser et al. (2019a)’s structural annota-
tions do not map nicely to the technical scheme specifications in either of the typologies 
we consider. Furthermore, the corpus is constrained to one election debate, and hence to 
a constrained set of speakers communicating in one particular genre. It is conceivable—
although not likely—that the annotation procedures we describe are somehow not gen-
eralisable beyond these speakers or this genre, even though the guidelines are in no way 
contextually tailored. In previous work, Walton’s taxonomy has been used to annotate 
corpora from different contexts, but results have varied (see Sect. 2.2). With respect to 
the PTA, the annotation we present here constitutes a first, so there is nothing to compare 
to. Lastly, the annotations reported on in Sect. 4 and evaluated in 5 are obtained by using 
only two experienced annotators. We suggest future annotation studies can experiment 
with multiple annotators and varying levels of experience, using texts from diverse gen-
res with dedicated argumentation-structural annotation, to verify the extend to which our 
methods and suggested revisions are generally applicable.
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Appendix B: ATIP Decision Tree for Determining Argument Form
See Fig. 4.
Fig. 4  Decision tree for determining argument form in the Argument Type Identification Procedure 
(ATIP)
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